DAVAO CITY (MindaNews / 11 August) — I started working in community development in Mindanao as early as 1998. From that time, I knew that international communities and donors’ involvement in the peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao, particularly in Bangsamoro, was extensive. This involvement occurred at an official level and at the level of civil society. In the 1996 Final Peace Agreement of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, the Donor Communities set up the United Nations Multi-Donor Programme to assist the MNLF communities and the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). This was followed by the Mindanao Trust Fund of the World Bank to help the communities of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
With the 2014 signing of the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB) that paved the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), the Bangsamoro became the focus of media attention and peace, humanitarian and human rights groups, as well as of civic institutions such as churches or universities locally and internationally.
With the BARMM in place, great hopes were vested in the international community’s role. For many, the term ‘Bangsamoro’ had an almost mystical significance; it was synonymous with Peacebuilding efforts, parliamentary form of government, and moral governance.
What is happening on the ground is deeply disappointing, giving rise to cynicism and despair as the level of horizontal violence escalates.
I ponder this question: Where will the Bangsamoro Region be in the next three to six years?
In answering this question, let us examine the timeline of post-conflict rehabilitation in Mindanao, mainly focusing first on the agreements between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Republic Act No. 6734, also known as the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was passed in 1989. It established the ARMM and provided for the creation of an autonomous government in the region. The law was ratified through a referendum in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which initially composed the ARMM. During this period, Zacaria Candao participated in ARMM’s first gubernatorial elections on February 12, 1990, and was elected the autonomous region’s first governor. He officially assumed the post months later, on July 6, 1990. He vied for a second term in the 1993 March elections but lost to Lininding P. Pangandaman.
The signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and MNLF on September 2, 1996, in Manila was a breakthrough. It was clear that the agreement aimed to end decades of conflict by granting political and economic autonomy to the MNLF through the expansion of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The agreement included provisions for rehabilitating conflict-affected areas and reintegrating former MNLF combatants, though its implementation faced challenges, including governance issues and limited resources.
In the general elections held on September 9, 1996, Nur Misuari was elected as the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Guimid Matalam was elected as the Vice Regional Governor. Despite its intended role in empowering local governance and promoting development, the ARMM struggled with corruption and inefficiency.
RA 6734 was followed by Republic Act No. 9054 known as the Expanded Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao which was passed in 2001. It amended RA 6734 to expand and strengthen the powers of the ARMM government. It also provided for a new referendum that included additional areas, resulting in the inclusion of Basilan (excluding Isabela City) in the ARMM. These two laws were instrumental in establishing and shaping the ARMM, which later evolved into the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) under the Bangsamoro Organic Law (Republic Act No. 11054) in 2018.
During the late 1990s, dissatisfaction with the peace agreement and its implementation led to the emergence of the MILF as a significant armed group seeking a more comprehensive resolution to the Moro struggle. This resulted in renewed conflict, culminating in President Joseph Estrada’s “All-Out War” against the MILF in March 2000, which caused significant military engagements and humanitarian crises in Mindanao. The conflict displaced thousands of civilians and led to widespread destruction in MILF-controlled areas, prompting international concern and calls for renewed peace talks.
In 2005, the Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) was established as a multi-donor fund to support post-conflict rehabilitation and development in Mindanao, particularly in areas affected by the MILF conflict. The MTF focused on funding social and economic development projects and facilitating various initiatives, including education, livelihood programs, and infrastructure projects aimed at rebuilding trust and cooperation among communities.
Between 2001 and 2008, peace talks resumed between the GRP and MILF, leading to various interim agreements aimed at addressing grievances and promoting peace. The negotiations culminated in the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which aimed to establish a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. However, the Philippine Supreme Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional, causing tensions and violence to flare again.
The peace process took a significant step forward on March 27, 2014, when the GRP and MILF signed the CAB, laying the foundation for the establishment of the BARMM. This agreement was seen as a crucial move toward lasting peace, incorporating lessons from previous agreements and aiming to address issues of governance and development comprehensively.
Following a successful plebiscite, the BARMM was officially created in February 2019. This new political entity has greater autonomy compared to the previous ARMM, with powers over local governance, fiscal autonomy, and other significant aspects of governance. The BARMM’s establishment marked a major milestone in the peace process, allowing for enhanced local governance and opportunities for economic development, with the MILF leading the transition government tasked with implementing the CAB’s provisions.
Since the signing of the GRP MNLF Peace Accord in 1996, the Bangsamoro government has continued to seek support from international donors, including the MTF, to implement development programs in the region. While there have been significant strides in governance and development, challenges remain, including lingering violence from splinter groups, socioeconomic issues, and the need for further integration of various stakeholders in the peace process.
There have been aseries of research on the impacts of donor aid and foreign assistance in conflict-prone communities, including the Bangsamoro. These researches reveal a complex picture. While foreign aid can provide essential resources for recovery, it also carries the risk of fostering dependency, inefficiencies, and sometimes exacerbating existing issues. From 1997, the Bangsamoro has been receiving different donor-assisted programs. These forms of assistance created a culture of dependency among the conflict-affected communities in the region. Although foreign aid has been crucial for rebuilding efforts, it has also led to segments of the population becoming dependent on external support. This dependency undermines local initiatives and self-sufficiency, stifling local governance and entrepreneurial efforts, and creating a cycle of aid reliance.
In the past years, these conflict-affected areas in the Bangsamoro often lacked the institutional frameworks necessary to effectively manage and utilize foreign aid. This resulted in misallocation of resources and aid did not align with the community’s actual needs. Aid initiatives prioritize short-term menu-type relief over sustainable development, further entrenching issues such as poverty, conflict, and poor governance.
From ARMM to BARMM, the region is perceived to having weak governance structures that further resulted in donor aid inadvertently contributing to corruption and mismanagement, in having the aid diverted away from essential services and development projects, exacerbating social tensions and inequities within the communities.
Despite these challenges, there are successful examples of foreign donor-driven projects. Take the case of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP), supported by international donors including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), is a notable example. The BDP focuses on improving infrastructure, education, and healthcare in the BARMM. JICA’s involvement has included building critical infrastructure like roads and schools, emphasizing participatory approaches to ensure that projects meet local needs. Additionally, community empowerment initiatives within the BDP, such as capacity-building programs and skills training for youth, have shown promise in fostering local ownership of development processes and reducing dependency on aid. However, these plans are under-utilized or kept in the cabinets or book shelves in the offices or libraries.
The future of the BARMM over the next three to six years is shaped by several key factors, including the successful implementation of initiatives like the Block Grant from the National Government, the European Union’s Support to the Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA), and various rehabilitation and development projects. These initiatives, particularly the Block Grant mandated by the Bangsamoro Organic Law (RA 11054), provide the BARMM with sustained and substantial funding crucial for implementing development programs, infrastructure projects, and social services. The autonomy in budget allocation that the Block Grant affords the BARMM allows the regional government to tailor its development programs to the specific needs of its people, potentially leading to more effective and locally appropriate interventions. Moreover, initiatives like SUBATRA focus on strengthening governance and capacity building within the BARMM, addressing issues like corruption and supporting the Normalization Track, which includes the decommissioning of MILF combatants and their reintegration into civilian life. These efforts are essential for reducing the likelihood of a return to armed conflict and creating a stable environment conducive to development.
However, the trajectory of the region will also be influenced by persistent challenges such as horizontal conflicts (including clan feuds) and corruption. Horizontal conflicts can undermine development efforts by creating instability, disrupting economic activities, and displacing communities. Meanwhile, corruption within the BARMM government could hinder the effective use of the Block Grant and other financial resources, leading to misallocation of funds, reduced public trust, and slower progress in development and peacebuilding.
The future of the Bangsamoro region can unfold in several ways. In an optimistic scenario, if the BARMM government effectively utilizes the Block Grant and implements governance reforms, the region could see significant economic growth, improved infrastructure, and enhanced social services, with a marked improvement in security and public trust. In a more moderate scenario, the BARMM might achieve some success, but ongoing corruption and unresolved horizontal conflicts could hamper progress, leading to uneven development and localized conflicts. In the worst-case scenario, failure to address corruption and conflict could result in significant setbacks, with mismanagement of resources and intensified violence potentially leading to a resurgence of armed conflict, undermining the peace process and the region’s development prospects.
Ultimately, the future of the Bangsamoro region will largely depend on the effectiveness of its governance, the successful implementation of peace and development initiatives, and the ability to address corruption and horizontal conflicts. If these challenges are adequately addressed, the region has the potential to become a model for peace and development. However, if they are not, the region risks falling into a cycle of instability and underdevelopment. The key to the region’s success lies in the BARMM government’s ability to implement reforms, build trust, and foster inclusive development.
(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. Mussolini T. Lidasan is Executive Director of the Al Qalam Institute of the Ateneo de Davao University. He served as Commissioner of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission from 2017 to 2019 and Member of Parliament of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao from 2019 to 2022).
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