MANILA (MindaNews / 11 December) — Death crept into the rice fields in the early afternoon of 30 October. That day, a bloody gun battle between two Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commanders and their followers killed nineteen fighters and displaced over 500 families. The clash was the result of a dispute between the two warring groups over ownership of 300 hectares of land in the village of Kilangan in Pagalungan municipality, Maguindanao del Sur province, in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Although both sides agreed to a ceasefire after the battle, civilians in the area still fear further violence.
The deadly encounter cast a shadow on the region’s war-to-peace transition, already shaken by growing political tensions and local conflicts . Hostilities between the MILF and the government are a thing of the past since the two sides signed a peace agreement over a decade ago, and the ex-rebels have been running the BARMM’s interim government since 2019. But deadly pockets of violence remain; as Crisis Group has regularly highlighted, localised conflicts within the region have actually increased since 2021.
Like the the Kilangan incident, many of these conflicts relate to land disputes. Unfortunately, such encounters remain a regular feature in various parts of the BARMM, particularly in Central Mindanao. Their increasing number, humanitarian impact (displacement, economic losses and property damage) and death count suggest that even though the Mindanao peace process continues to move forward, challenges are piling up along the road to durable peace and stability. It is important to note that while a substantial part of the current flare-ups relates to clashes among MILF members, land conflicts also involve local politicians, other armed groups and civilians. These violent encounters should raise the alarm among regional and national authorities, as well as international supporters of the peace process.
Three intertwined issues drive land conflicts across the region, contributing to a feeling of insecurity among local communities, amid widespread uncertainty around the unresolved issue of a possible postponement of the parliamentary polls from 2025 to 2026.
First, persisting gaps in land governance enable violent competition over resources. Despite years of regional efforts by the MILF-led interim administration and local governments in resolving local disputes, it is still unclear how ministries and agencies make decisions about overlapping land claims among themselves, especially when land-related issues fall across multiple institutional mandates that straddle the BARMM ministries and the local government units in its provinces. Some bureaucracies also appear to be overly cautious when it comes to dealing with anything related to land. Part of the reason is an inconsistency between formal legislation and customary understandings of land ownership and use in the region, which has led to policy and implementation inertia. Given these difficulties in enforcing the law, and inconsistencies about the legal framework itself, it is not surprising that some community members assert claims by arming themselves, looking for stronger patrons or even joining an armed outfit as a source of protection. Once violence breaks out, every land-related killing risks triggering a protracted clan vendetta (known as rido or pagbanta).
Second, uncertainties prevail regarding law enforcement in the region. Five years into the BARMM transition, those tasked with managing local violence haven’t yet been entirely successful. Some BARMM ministries track trends in violence, train mediators, and aim to resolve intra-MILF disputes, as well as clan feuds. Once firefights break out, however, these actors are mostly reactive, and even when they manage to negotiate a ceasefire, they often struggle to durably resolve conflicts. Mechanisms introduced by the peace process, such as the Joint Peace and Security Teams, have had a mixed record in managing this violence. That leaves the Philippine military as the only credible actor to actually put an end to fighting between armed parties. Traditionally, instead of directly interfering in firefights, the army has tended to let warring parties fight each other, only stepping in when the situation escalates significantly. In the case of the Kilangan encounter, for example, the military stayed away from the clash, and only deployed buffer forces to prevent further fighting after both parties agreed to a ceasefire. That said, some units based in the BARMM have recently pursued a more assertive approach and aimed to intervene as and when clashes happened.
A third issue is the proliferation of firearms in the Bangsamoro. The 2014 peace agreement foresaw an ambitious program to deal with the issue. On the one hand, decommissioned MILF fighters are to give up the weapons owned by the organisation. On the other hand, the peace agreement mentioned the need for “reduction” and “management” of small and light firearms beyond those held by the MILF, but without providing details as to how that would be achieved such. Even if it has faced delays, rebel disarmament remains on track, but there is a loophole in the decommissioning process, as guns owned by former rebels in their individual capacity are not part of the deal. More problematic, thousands of firearms remain in circulation across the region, which means other actors involved in land disputes are often also armed. Over the last few years, Manila – with donor support – has tried to implement several programs to curb the spread of firearms, for example by instructing the military collect weapons from local politicians or civilians in exchange for handing out cash or socio-economic projects. Yet even in such cases armed groups, village officials and families often manage to quickly procure new firearms. My fieldwork in Maguindanao and Lanao a few weeks ago once again highlighted this basic truth: for many locals, guns often serve as a fundamental means of protection.
There are of course other variables at play beyond these three generic factors, such as frustration among the MILF cadres about the slow implementation of the normalisation process and individual motivations for some Moro strongmen (whether from MILF or local political groups) to long for power and resources. But overall, these are the most deeply-rooted drivers of land-related violence, and the hardest to overcome.
So what can be done to keep this violence in check? There are no easy solutions, but it is clear that both the MILF-led transition government and Manila need to redouble their efforts – and remind themselves that dealing with the complex land question is a part of the 2014 peace agreement itself. Not addressing this issue in what is meant to be the last stretch of the peace process could jeopardise hard won gains of the last decade in bringing durable peace to Mindanao.
First, the regional authorities need to dedicate more resources to resolving land disputes. For starters, the interim government should do more to determine land ownership claims in critical areas and decide how ministries should work together to resolve land conflicts while coordinating with national agencies and local government units in particular complex cases. In this context, the set-up of a BARMM Inter-Agency Working Group on Land Administration and Management, as proposed last year by the regional Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Agrarian Reform, would be a welcome step. BARMM ministries should also dovetail with the MILF’s existing conflict resolution mechanisms to ensure that ceasefire agreements between warring commanders and their followers take potential land issues into account instead of ignoring this sensitive topic, which is often at the heart of violence. A major challenge here is to formalise these pacts and provide clear sanctions for possible violations. The Kilangan encounter is a perfect example of why this is necessary: while the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire, the land dispute remains unresolved, and could well lead to further fighting further down the line.
In addition, the region needs credible law enforcement. To avoid accidental run-ins, military units should continue coordinating with the MILF leadership when intervening during land conflicts which involve ex-guerrillas. Field units based in the region should also adopt common rules of engagement and stop firefights as early as possible, after exhausting all non-lethal means such as signaling or warning shots. For their part, the MILF must continue internal disciplining of commanders who either go rogue or repeatedly violate the organisation’s internal code of conduct. National and regional authorities should also do more to sanction politicians or clan leaders who actively or indirectly stir violence.
Regarding the issue of firearms, Crisis Group suggested a few options in a past report, ranging from setting up government-MILF working groups to deal with fighters’ personal firearms to a broader campaign designed to register weapons, in order to reduce the number of unlicensed firearms in circulation. Other steps could include the national government enforcing stricter oversight of small-arms suppliers, and replicating provincial efforts (such as in Basilan) to collect loose guns.
Lastly, the security sector must prepare for the municipal and provincial elections next year. Even if the parliamentary polls are postponed, local elections will proceed. In many cases, political competition further aggravates land disputes, and vice versa. The BARMM’s Special Geographic Area, comprising 63 villages that formerly belonged to North Cotabato province, is particularly sensitive, with a clear overlap of land conflicts and political rivalries down to the village level. Given the complexities of controlling electoral violence in urban settings, authorities should also pay particular attention to cities such as Cotabato and Marawi. The military and the police, together with Bangsamoro ministries, should conduct a detailed conflict mapping well ahead of the elections to develop strategies to best prevent such incidents.
While the level of violence has undeniably reduced, too many people have died in the Bangsamoro since the historic 2014 peace agreement. While the overall trajectory of the peace process is a positive one, the Kilangan incident is yet another reminder that deadly violence remains a regular occurrence in pockets of the Bangsamoro. As the peace process nears completion, both Manila and the MILF-led BARMM administration need to double down on their commitment to prevent further bloodshed. Containing local conflict is vital to ensuring a successful outcome to what has been, so far, the only peace process of the last decade that is delivering, globally.
(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. Georgij Engelbrecht is the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for the Philippines. He focuses mostly on the various conflicts and peace processes within the country).
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